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Respondents,
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VILLAGE VOICE MEDIA HOLDINGS,       
LLC, d/ b/a Backpage.com; RULING GRANTING
BACKPAGE.COM,: LLC, NEW TIMES DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
MEDIA, LLC, d/ b/ a Backpage.com,
Petitioners,
BARUTI HOPSON,
Defendant Below.
Various companies ( collectively, Backpage.com) move for discretionary review of
the trial court' s order denying its motion to dismiss.  The trial court certified the issue for
discretionary review and the parties agree that review is appropriate.  This court grants
review.  RAP 2. 3( b)( 4).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs- Respondents J. S., S. L., and L. C. are three minors who allege they were
abused by adult pimps who prostituted them by posting advertisements about the
minors on the backpage.com website.    Backpage. com moved to dismiss the suit,
arguing it is immune under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act ( CDA), 47
U. S. C. § 230, as merely a " neutral conduit" for third party speech.  Mot. for Disc. Rev.,
App.  E at 6  ( Report of Proceedings ( RP) Apr.  26,  2013).   Plaintiffs responded that
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Backpage.com is not immune because the company develops illegal content by
creating a section on its site for " escort" advertisements,  provides information to the
public in this category,  and imposes posting rules and restrictions that essentially
provide pimps with guidelines to have their minor escort ads accepted for posting.
The superior court denied the motion to dismiss,  stating,  " the plaintiffs just
crossed the line in terms of trying to establish that Backpage was a content developer."
Mot. for Disc. Rev., App. E at 51 ( RP Apr. 26, 2013); see also Mot. for Disc. Rev., App.
E at 50 ( RP Apr. 26, 2013) (" These are where I' m most concerned . . . it' s the posting
guidelines.").    The superior court certified the order for discretionary review,  RAP
2. 3( b)( 4), and both parties agree that review is warranted,  albeit for slightly different
reasons.  The trial court stayed proceedings.
ANALYSIS
The motion presents three related issues for discretionary review:   ( 1) Whether
Backpage.com is entitled to immunity under the CDA as a " provider . . . of an interactive
computer service," Mot. for Disc. Rev. at 9; 47 U. S. C. § 230(c)( 1) ( stating that Internet
service providers shall not be " treated as the publisher or speaker of any information");
2) Whether Backpage.com is instead an  " information content provider"  not granted
immunity by the CDA, 47 U. S. C. § 230(f)(3) ( defining a content provider as an entity that
is responsible  "for the creation or development of information provided through the
Internet");  and,  ( 3)    Whether our state' s  " liberal"  CrR 12( b)( 6)  gives  " Washington
procedural rules precedence over federal substantive rights."  Mot. for Disc. Rev. at 15.
1 They argue that "every" advertisement in this section is for prostitution.  Resp. to Mot.
for Disc. Rev. at 3 ( emphasis theirs).
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RAP 2. 3( b)( 4)
RAP 2. 3( b)( 4) permits this court to grant discretionary review when "[ t]he superior
court has certified,  or all the parties to the litigation have stipulated,  that the order
involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for a
difference of opinion and that immediate review of the order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation."  The trial court has so certified, the parties have so
stipulated, and this court agrees.
2
Controlling Question of Law
Both parties recognize that the CDA provides immunity from liability if
Backpage.com is a " provider .    .  of an interactive computer service."3 47 U. S. C.  §
230(c)( 1).  See generally Schneider v. Amazon.com,  108 Wn. App.  454,  31 P. 3d 37
2001) ( dismissing claims against Amazon. com because it was immune from suit under
the CDA).  In general, the issue of immunity from suit warrants review pursuant to RAP
2. 3( b).   See Robb v.  City of Seattle,  159 Wn. App.  133,  139,  245 P. 3d 242  (2010)
noting discretionary review granted under RAP 2. 3( b)( 4) on issue whether public duty
doctrine barred the action),  reversed on the merits,  176 Wn.2d 427  ( 2013);  see
generally Chadwick Farms Owners Ass'n v.  FHC LLC,  166 Wn.2d 178,  184-86, 207
2 Because this court determines to grant review pursuant to RAP 2. 3( b)( 4), it need not
reach Backpage.com' s arguments that review is also appropriate pursuant to RAP
2. 3( b)( 1) and ( 2).
3 An " interactive computer service" is defined as:
any information service, system, or access software provider that provides
or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server,
including specifically a service or system that provides access to the
Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or
educational institutions.
47 U. S. C. § 230(0(2).
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P. 3d 1251  ( 2009)  ( immunity issues raised on discretionary review);  Byrd v.  System
Transp.,  Inc.,  124 Wn. App.  196,  198, 99 P. 3d 394  (2004) ( issue of immunity under
Industrial Insurance Act), review denied,  153 Wn. 2d 2004 ( 2005).   This court agrees
with the trial court and the parties that because the case " cannot proceed if the Court
agrees that the Backpage.com defendants are immune from liability," Backpage.com' s
motion for discretionary review involves a controlling question of law.
4 Resp. to Mot. for
Disc. Rev. at 5; RAP 2. 3( b)( 4).
Substantial Ground for a Difference of Opinion
The primary  " difference of opinion,"  here,  is whether Backpage.com is an
immune Internet service provider or a potentially liable " information content provider."
47 U. S. C.  §  230( c)( 1)  &  ( f)(3).    Backpage.com contends that an Internet service
provider's mere knowledge that a third party is posting illegal content does not preclude
CDA immunity.    Moreover,  an Internet service provider retains immunity even if it
encourage[s]"  third parties to publish unlawful content.    Mot.  for Disc.  Rev.  at 10
quoting Hill v.  StubHub,  Inc., 727 S. E. 2d 550, 560 ( N. C. App. 2012), review denied,
736 S. E.2d 757 ( N. C. 2013)).   Accordingly,  it takes the position that Backpage. com' s
mere creation of posting guidelines is insufficient to transform it into an information
content provider.
5 See generally M.A.  ex rel.  P.K.  v.  Village Voice Media Holdings,
LLC., 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1044 ( E: D. Mo. 2011) ( holding that Backpage.com is not a
4 Additionally, because this issue involves immunity, discretionary review of the trial
court's order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.  RAP
2. 3( b)( 4).
5 Amici the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the Center for Democracy & Technology
support Backpage.com' s position that it is immune.
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service provider despite allegation in complaint that "[ Backpage has] posting rules and
limitations which aid in the sight veiling of illegal sex services ads to create the veil of
legality").
Respondents answer that the CDA' s grant of immunity is not absolute and if an
Internet service provider is responsible even in part for the creation or development of
content, it is no longer immune.  Resp. to Mot. for Disc. Rev. at 6; Fair Housing of San
Fernando Valley v.   Roommates.com,   521 F. 3d 1157,   1162-63  ( 9th Cir.   2008).
Specifically,
E]ven if the data are supplied by third parties, a website operator may still
contribute to the content' s illegality and thus be liable as a developer.
Providing immunity every time a website uses data initially obtained from
third parties would eviscerate the exception to section 230 for
develop[ ing]" unlawful content " in whole or in part."  47 U. S. C. § 230(f)(3).
Rommates.com,  521 F. 3d at 1171  ( footnote omitted).    Consequently,  respondents
argue that the trial court correctly concluded that Backpage. com encouraged and
developed unlawful content,  although they also acknowledge,  " the conduct of the
Backpage.com defendants is sufficiently unique . . . so that there is substantial ground
for a difference of opinion."  Resp. to Mot. for Disc. Rev. at 8.
A secondary area for a difference of opinion is Backpage.com' s argument that
our state' s CR 12( b)( 6)   standard improperly trumps substantive federal law.
Backpage.com briefed this issue to the trial court.  Mot. for Disc. Rev., App. D. at 18- 20.
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trial court generally addressed the CR
12(b)( 6) standard, Mot. for Disc. Rev., App. E at 39, 49, 52 ( RP Apr. 26, 2013), but it is
unclear from the record whether this issue was included in the trial court' s certification
for discretionary review.   Mot. for Disc. Rev., App. E at 50- 52 ( RP Apr. 26, 2013).  At
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oral argument before this court,  plaintiffs did not appear to consent to review of this
issue.
This court agrees that the trial court' s order involves a controlling question of law
as to which there is a substantial ground for a difference of opinion.    In addition,
because this issue comes before this court on a request for discretionary review of the
trial court' s denial of a motion to dismiss, it is appropriate to include within the grant of
discretionary review the significance of our state' s pleading standards in reviewing
claims of immunity under federal law.   RAP 2. 3( e); see generally Schneider,  108 Wn.
App. at 459 (" If a plaintiff can prove any set of facts consistent with the complaint that
would entitle him or her to relief, including hypothetical facts not in the formal record,
then the claim should not be dismissed." ( quoting Rodriguez v.  Perez,  99 Wn.   App.
439, 442,  994 P. 2d 874, review denied,  141 Wn.2d 1020 ( 2000)).   Accordingly,  it is
hereby
ORDERED that Backpage.com' s motion for discretionary review is granted.  The
Clerk of Court will issue-.a perfection letter.
DATED this 26   `     day of 2013.
OVICIS
rora R. Bearse
Court Commissioner
cc:      James C. Grant
Ambika K. Doran
Erik L. Bauer
Michael T. Pfau
Darrel Cochran
Venkat Balasubramani
Hon. Susan Serko
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